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Abstract
Objectives—Each of the nuclear power plants in the US is encircled by an Emergency Planning 
Zone (EPZ). Within each EPZ, government officials, utility professionals, emergency managers, 
and public health practitioners collectively conduct extensive planning, exercises, and outreach to 
better protect their communities in the event of a nuclear accident. Our objective was to conduct a 
cross-sectional study of off-site public health preparedness within EPZs to better understand the 
dynamics of nuclear preparedness and uncover lessons for all-hazards preparedness.
Methods—Using a qualitative, interview-based method, we consulted 120 county emergency 
managers, state health preparedness officers, state radiation health officials, and industry officials 
from 17 EPZs in ten different states.
Results—Interviewees reflected that EPZ emergency preparedness is generally robust, results 
from strong public-private partnership between nuclear plants and emergency management 
agencies, and enhances all-hazard preparedness. However, there exist a few areas which merit 
further study and improvement. These areas include cross-state coordination, digital public 
communication, and optimizing the level of public education within EPZs.
Conclusions—This first-of-its-kind study provides a cross-sectional snapshot of emergency 
preparedness in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding nuclear power plants.
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1 Introduction
Half of the US population lives in close proximity to the nation’s 65 nuclear power plants 
(see Text Box 1) (Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2013). The safety of the 
communities living in the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) encircling these nuclear power 
plants has long been the subject of debate. For example, the size of an EPZ and the scope of 
emergency planning around nuclear power plants are challenged (Thomas et al. 2011 ; 
Government Accountability Office 2013). This debate intensified after the nuclear disaster 
in Fukushima stressed the framework for nuclear disaster response, leading some to 
recommend an evaluation of planning in the US (UPMC Center for Health Security 2012; 
U.S. Nuclear Agency 2013).
Text Box 1
About Emergency Planning Zones
EPZs are situated as two concentric circles around each plant (see Figure 2) (United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1980). The dimensions of each EPZ are based on 
two anticipated exposure pathways: the first one is a 10-mile radius for the shorter-term 
“plume exposure pathway” and the second is a 50-mile radius for “ingestion exposure 
pathway” zone for longer-term exposure. Because the duration of time between a major 
nuclear plant accident and the start of a major release of radioactive material could be as 
short as a few hours, preparedness within the 10-mile EPZ is of crucial importance.
We conducted a novel investigation of community-level preparedness activities within 10-
mile EPZs, the primary outcome of which was extensive documentation of the opinions of 
county-level emergency preparedness officials regarding issues of public health as they 
relate to radiological emergency preparedness. A secondary outcome was to identify 
principles of best practice – via the synthesis of our research findings – to inform future 
efforts in public health preparedness for communities located in the vicinity of nuclear 
power plants and beyond.
2 Methodology
2.1 IRB Approval
Given that the research team interviewed individuals in their professional capacities on their 
opinions about response systems, this study does not qualify as human subjects research. 
Therefore, IRB approval for this study was not required.
2.2 Selection Criteria for EPZs
The research team first conducted an informal review of scholarly literature, government 
reports, industry whitepapers, and media articles to assess the current state of nuclear 
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emergency preparedness in the US. The review offered valuable guidance and insight into 
the dynamics of existing nuclear emergency management practices, but revealed little about 
variation in state preparedness practices, best practices, and outstanding gaps. Therefore, the 
research team identified a representative sample of 17 EPZs in 43 counties across 10 states. 
Sites were chosen to reflect the diversity of approaches to ensuring nuclear preparedness, 
which in turn depend on variables such as governance structures, demographics, and 
emergency management policies at the state and local levels (Figure 1). For example, two of 
the states examined had limited or no “home rule”1 while eight states (including two 
“commonwealths”)2 practiced home rule. Eight states were part of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) Agreement State Program. Additionally, some states operated county-
level health departments while others did not. Location-specific challenges, variances in 
emergency preparedness policies, and the presence of special populations were also 
considered. For instance, nine states in the sample had developed plans for stockpiling and 
distributing potassium iodide (KI) to their constituents in the event of an emergency. Some 
EPZs also spanned state boundaries, raising issues of cross-jurisdictional emergency 
preparedness and response. Finally, while many of the EPZs studied were home to large 
urban populations, others contained significant agricultural assets.
2.3 Interviews with Key Informants
Next, the research team conducted a series of exploratory, semi-structured interviews with 
key informants from state and local governments and representatives from the nuclear 
industry located within each of the selected EPZs. These individuals, who maintain 
responsibility for ensuring the health and safety of the public during nuclear emergencies, 
included public health officials, emergency managers, health preparedness officers, radiation 
health officials, and nuclear utility managers. We gained access to interviewees by locating 
their contact information (telephone numbers and email), which was available on the 
websites of state and local public offices.
Consent to participate in an interview was granted either verbally or via email. The majority 
of the interviews took place over the phone (88), though a minority of interviewees elected 
to meet in person (1) or answer questions via e-mail (3). The principal investigators of the 
project (AA and RM) led each discussion using a protocol of open-ended questions. These 
questions, which were derived from the informal literature review, addressed issues relevant 
to the current state of nuclear preparedness in the US (Appendix 1). We employed dedicated 
note-takers during phone calls in order to retain records of each interview. These notes, in 
turn, were catalogued on a secure, password-protected server. Findings originating from the 
interviews were considered not-for-attribution, and the names and institutional affiliations of 
each informant are not disclosed in this document. Ultimately, the research team completed 
a total of 92 interviews with 120 individuals.
1“Home rule” describes a legal path by which a state grants authority to a local government; home rule creates local autonomy and 
limits the degree of state influence in local affairs.
2Traditionally, commonwealth states have more granular local government entities than non-commonwealth states. For example, a 
citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania resides within several distinctive local government entities: a township which is 
encompassed by a municipality, which is in turn encompassed by a county. Often, each of these entities has its own emergency 
preparedness practitioners and responsibilities.
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Based on recurring themes identified from conversations with the interviewees, the research 
team categorized the interview findings into nine areas of importance that require continued 
attention from emergency managers, public health practitioners, and policymakers (see 
“Findings”). The team then addressed remaining gaps in nuclear preparedness practice in the 
US, outlined recommendations for strengthening public health preparedness in EPZs, and 
offered suggestions for future research endeavors in these areas.
3 Findings
3.1 Governance and Duties
Federal law requires that emergency plans be in place for responding to radiological 
emergencies at nuclear power plants (44 CFR Part 350 2011). The approach to meeting 
these obligations varies. Indeed, historical attributes of a state impact the organization and 
distribution of responsibilities. Some states depend heavily on local governments while 
others contain counties not legally required to adhere to state-level recommendations. All 
planning is ultimately done in accordance with relevant Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidance and regulations.
State governments share preparedness responsibilities with local governments. Most states 
utilize a “top down” approach to radiological preparedness, with capacity and responsibility 
concentrated at the state- and county-levels. Some states, particularly states designated as 
commonwealths, have greater involvement of municipal officials. One emergency 
management director noted, “Being a home rule state, the governing authority gets down to 
the local level – the state has political authority, but the [state] Constitution drives local 
control down to the village.” Similarly, other emergency managers reported that, compared 
to local governments, the state plays a minimal role in regulating nuclear preparedness 
activities.
County-level emergency management agencies typically serve as the primary entities 
responsible for radiological preparedness. Generally, county-level emergency management 
agencies have a radiological planner on staff. In other cases multiple individuals share tasks. 
In some states, counties retain in-house radiological analysts, who lend important expertise 
to preparedness activities. However, some counties prefer that states permit autonomous 
county-level emergency preparedness activities. For example, officials in one independent 
city (which did not fall under the jurisdiction of a county-level government), maintained that 
they are able to control roadways without the need for the state government acquiescence 
required by their county-level counterparts.
In states that involve municipal governments in planning, some EPZs contain over 20 
municipalities, each with an individual serving as a municipal radiological officer slated to 
represent the municipality in an emergency. These municipalities frequently rely on 
committed, but aging, volunteers who often perform myriad other municipal tasks, such as 
serving in the fire department. One informant stated, “We’re all wearing a lot of hats. There 
aren’t a lot of experts at the local level.” However, interaction with preparedness 
professionals at the nuclear power plant primarily occurs at the county level. Accordingly, a 
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prior study reports that county-level personnel were more likely to rate their relationship 
with nuclear power plants as high quality versus their municipal counterparts (MacManus 
and Caruson 2010).
State departments of environment and agriculture provide additional support. These agencies 
conduct field monitoring, inventory agricultural assets, and assist with education.
Additionally, many states are Agreement State Programs (2013). These states have signed 
an agreement with the NRC authorizing the state to regulate certain uses of radioactive 
materials (such as medical applications), but not nuclear power, within the state. These 
states benefit from state-level radiological expertise, cultivated by the enhanced role the 
state assumes as a program participant, augmenting the emergency preparedness capacity 
that can be used within EPZs.
Notably – and unlike the case for all-hazards emergencies in which public health 
preparedness divisions play active roles in preparedness and response– state and county 
health departments are generally not fully integrated into response efforts. Their role is 
predominately limited to management of KI, when applicable. In a minority of states, the 
state health department serves as the location of the state’s radiation bureau and source of 
subject-matter experts on radiation. In other states, the radiation expertise of the state lies 
outside the health department. County health departments are primarily focused on 
managing evacuation reception centers and stockpiling/distributing KI.
3.2 Education and Outreach
Public education in EPZs consists of ensuring that the public is aware of what actions to take 
during emergencies. In most cases the utility company and county-level emergency 
management agencies collaborate to conduct education.
Interviewees cited meetings, calendars, pamphlets, phone books, and programming on TV 
and radio as methods used to educate the public about drills, evacuation routes, KI, and 
other issues. Some local agencies also stated that they have used social media to keep the 
public informed. However, the use of social media remained more of a “wish list” item for 
most.
Interviewees sometimes cited outdated means of information sharing, such as phonebooks 
and calendars, as concerning. Several interviewees explained, however, that they were 
struggling with maintaining their budgets and that updating to newer technologies was not 
feasible. One county-level emergency manager also stated that federal regional evaluators 
do not reward social media efforts, as evaluation criteria stipulates only that information is 
disseminated annually and suggested means do not include digital formats (United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1980 ). Another informant, a preparedness coordinator, felt 
that “nuclear power throughout the country has done a horrible job getting messages across 
to the public. They are overshadowed by the anti-nuke people. If you don’t react to the 
information out there, bad information might stick. The nuclear power agencies and 
companies really missed the boat on this.”
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Despite these shortcomings, interviewees were generally confident in their approach to 
education, citing the fact that most plants have been established for decades and employ a 
significant percentage of the local population, thereby allowing public health knowledge to 
diffuse throughout the community. One informant reported, “The public asks a lot of good 
questions, and we have given them enough information for people to make informed 
decisions.” Another noted that “as more people become interested in emergency 
preparedness, being able to quench that thirst for knowledge is important… There is more 
interest in what is occurring in nuclear energy – and in emergency preparedness.” However, 
some interviewees also reported particular difficulties in engaging with hard-to-reach 
populations (e.g., members of younger demographics and farms). Additionally, interviewees 
expressed concern that younger individuals moving into the EPZ might not assimilate 
knowledge as well as long-standing residents.
Some interviewees expressed concern about the level of retention the public has of actions 
to take during an emergency. Participants consistently noted that no formal study of the 
public’s retention of nuclear safety information had been conducted within their EPZ. A 
commonly relied upon metric is attendance at events or the changing rate of calls to 
emergency management. Though jurisdictions were pleased to report that the level of calls 
did not tend to increase following pre-announced siren tests, others conveyed that they were 
surprised by the concern expressed in their EPZ following Fukushima. The education of 
hospital personnel at response hospitals regarding patient care issues is primarily the 
responsibility of state agencies.
3.3 Evacuation
Every EPZ reported that evacuation is the primary protective action for the public during an 
emergency, with only select institutions preparing to shelter-in-place (e.g., hospitals and 
prisons) when conditions permit. Several EPZs have their designated response hospital 
within the 10-mile EPZ, offering advantages for treating occupational injuries, but posing 
evacuation concerns.
Most evacuation plans are based on a phased evacuation in which the population in the 2 
miles surrounding the plant is automatically evacuated along with the population 5 miles 
downwind of the plant in a keyhole shape. The remaining population in the EPZ is 
evacuated according to weather patterns, plume direction, and radiological data. A minority 
of EPZs surveyed practice a “360/10” evacuation in which a 360-degree evacuation within 
the 10-mile radius surrounding the plant is ordered.
Informants also reported numerous social, political, and economic concerns when speaking 
about the challenges of evacuation. One emergency preparedness manager noted, “The 
biggest concern in not evacuating the psychological aspect of it. If you evacuate 360/10 and 
nothing happens, how much of an economic impact will there be, as far as reentry goes? We 
found out by doing our exercises [that] it will be really, really hard – especially for media 
and public perception – when we don’t adhere to 360/10. We are perceived as being lax or 
not conservative enough for public protection. We struggle with that.” Still, many 
interviewees expressed a strong preference for phased evacuation. Interviewees explained 
that by evacuating everyone simultaneously, there emerges a risk of impeding the 
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evacuation of individuals closest to the plant, thereby jeopardizing those in the most 
potential danger. One interviewee also reported that FEMA is promoting a “keyhole” 
approach, which requires residents in the two-mile ring around the plant to evacuate, along 
with people in the five-mile ring in the projected path of the radiological release. Others 
favored 360/10 evacuation because it is less vulnerable to wind shift and other factors, 
ensuring that the population is evacuated. Many of these participants also believe that 
shadow evacuation (i.e., a situation wherein people not in the mandatory evacuation zone 
choose to evacuate) is likely to take place throughout the entire 10-mile EPZ and beyond.”
While most interviewees believed that their evacuation routes were optimized, as 
determined by evacuation time studies, other concerns about the evacuation process were 
noted. In some EPZs, there are waterways that would be challenging to evacuate. Similar 
concerns include instances in which evacuation is physically restricted either by geography, 
road infrastructure, or weather-related roadway impediments.
3.4 Long-term Sheltering
Many interviewees expressed concerns about where evacuees would be sheltered once 
evacuated. In some EPZs, the responsibility for planning these shelters fell to non-
governmental organizations, such as the Red Cross. In EPZs where the public would not 
have to cross jurisdictions to evacuate, the process of sheltering was considered to be easier 
from a governance perspective. Despite anticipating assistance from FEMA, many indicated 
that it would be challenging to decontaminate, treat, house, and feed volumes of people for a 
potentially extended period time. Most interviewees expressed a preference for sheltering in 
place in the event of a nuclear emergency, citing the challenges associated with evacuating 
certain populations, including prisoners, hospital patients, and nursing home residents. 
Another notable challenge is ensuring that adequate space is available for every evacuee. 
One emergency manager noted that his EPZ simply does not have the space to house all 
evacuees during an emergency, and that complying with American Red Cross sheltering 
regulations further complicates sheltering efforts.
3.5 Exercises
Within each 10-mile EPZ, utility operators and state and local governments, along with 
NRC, FEMA, and other federal agencies, take part in evaluated exercises every 2 years. 
Specifically, these exercises focus on protecting the public from exposure to, and inhalation 
of, airborne radiation. Interviewees reported that exercises typically include a variety of 
community stakeholders, including: the nuclear plant, hospitals, nursing homes, daycares, 
school, municipality offices, and, in some cases, the Coast Guard.
Several interviewees expressed concern that the exercises were “unrealistic” or “antiquated,” 
and that actions performed during exercises would not be performed during a real 
emergency. One interviewee noted that most exercises emphasize hostile action-based 
scenarios even though a focus on natural disasters would be a more realistic approach. 
Another informant, a preparedness coordinator, stated that an actual emergency “is going to 
be chaos, even within just a ten-mile zone. When we do drills, the scenarios are pre-
fabricated to the point where we know this is going to happen at 10:02, sound sirens at 
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11:30, all because ‘that’s the way it happens.’ There is no room for the unexpected.” 
Another coordinator also felt that federal authorities involved in exercises and planning 
efforts sometimes fail to account for the most realistic threats to nuclear plants:
“Plants that are on a fault-line or would have to deal with that should look at a 
capability to deal with those issues, but NRC and FEMA put everything into one-
size-fits-all. Planning is made more difficult because of this. We just did an 
[evacuation time estimate] and they talk about a rapid-moving event (a release 
within an hour), and we have to deal with that. The whole ETE was based on this 
and that’s insanity. That will never happen. I don’t want to check a box. I want to 
have a real capability to deal with real issues. Sometimes the regulators check 
boxes instead of looking at realistic situations and capabilities.”
Additionally, time and money constraints often prohibit EPZ communities from conducting 
exercises that explore long-term responses to nuclear emergencies. One interviewee noted 
that exercises in his jurisdiction had never before accounted for the secondary consequences 
of a nuclear emergency that might manifest after response and during recovery, stating, 
particularly after the response phase and during recovery, “Only now after Fukushima are 
we really thinking about new things – when to open up restaurants, dealing with the fear, 
assurance.” Interviewees also reported that ingestion phase exercises, which cover a 50-mile 
radius around the plant and concern the ingestion of contaminated foods and liquids, are not 
conducted frequently enough to be useful. Given that these exercises occur every 8 years, 
employee turnover patterns result in many key staff members never having participated in an 
ingestion phase exercise. Some counties are located in two EPZs and report enhanced 
preparedness resulting from participating in annual, rather than biannual, exercises.
3.6 Interfacing with Agriculture
Agricultural areas located inside EPZs present nuclear planners with unique challenges to 
shelter livestock and protect/preserve crops. Establishing contact with farm operators in 
these areas before and during a nuclear emergency is difficult as individual farm data may 
be viewed as proprietary and private. Approaches implemented include: creating databases 
of farms and their relevant crops or livestock, asking that farmers submit annual updates to 
“special needs cards” which provide an inventory of a farm’s assets, and liaising with 
community leaders and livestock providers to develop evacuation plans and discuss safety 
concerns.
Many of the jurisdictions included in this study contained farms, but some lacked specific 
mechanisms for communicating with agricultural communities and accounting for livestock 
and crops during public health emergencies. One radiological response coordinator noted, 
“There is…no database on farms in the EPZ. This is a missing part – when we go to a 
general emergency, we need to know where the farms are and where feed is stored, etc.” 
Other interviewees also expressed discontent with their awareness of the types of 
agricultural assets within the EPZ, with some concerned about the ability to obtain 
information from state departments of agriculture as well as the US Department of 
Agriculture. Some states reported positive results from routinely working directly with the 
state university’s agriculture extension office to maintain communication with farms. One 
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state reported improved preparedness after the utility decided to begin supporting a 
radiological emergency preparedness position within the agriculture department. Planners in 
other jurisdictions also reported that designating farmers themselves as disseminators of 
emergency information proved effective.
3.7 Utility Company Support for Positions
Interviewees reported that utility companies, to varying degrees, assist in planning and 
outreach, and generally play a crucial role in building and maintaining human capital within 
EPZs. Almost all county-level interviewees reported that their radiological positions and 
budget are financially supported by the utility company, an arrangement that has been 
ongoing for decades. One emergency manager shared, “If the utility provides lots of money 
with expectation that [the radiological emergency plan] receives attention, I want to make 
sure they get what they are paying for. My staff works with them to help implement [the 
plan].”
Interviewees reported that a strong partnership between county-level emergency planners 
and their counterparts at the utility are a key component to the effective management of the 
EPZ. In some places, these relationships were said to involve almost daily communications 
between individuals.
An interview with a utility representative revealed that the primary focus of the utility is 
nuclear emergency planning, while the responsibility for addressing the needs of the public 
resides with municipal institutions, since “they know their counties and fire companies 
better than we do.” The representative also shared that in some states, legislative funding 
enables the utility to finance training for nuclear emergency planners. However, in other 
states, these positions are often filled by volunteers, presenting the utility with staffing 
problems: “We would prefer that they were all paid. There aren’t many young people 
volunteering, so [we] are having a hard time filling spots after someone retires or dies.”
3.8 Potassium Iodide
Of states that choose to incorporate KI into their emergency plans, varied means to distribute 
it are employed. States pre-distribute KI via either their health departments, by mail to 
residents, or via mail vouchers to be used at their pharmacies to obtain the medication. In 
states that incorporate KI into their emergency plans, the health department is the 
coordinator of the program, which makes the health department a larger component in 
nuclear emergency preparedness relative to that in non-KI states.
Interviewees expressed a number of concerns regarding KI. A common refrain of 
interviewees in states that participate in the NRC’s KI program3 was that the uptake/pre-
distribution of KI amongst the public is very low (Rosselli et al. 2011; Zwolinski et al. 
2012 ). Interviewees, in some cases, hailed this as a paradoxical benefit as it would delimit 
any false sense of security engendered by what many fear could be misconceived as a 
“magic radiation pill.” For example, a health district coordinator noted that “people are not 
3The NRC KI program provides participating states with supplies of KI for the population within the 10-mile EPZ.
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aware at all of the limitations of KI, unfortunately…There is always a risk that someone will 
take KI and not evacuate.” Several informants also acknowledged other challenges 
associated with refusing to distribute KI. A state-level health manager shared, “Everyone 
was opposed to [KI] at the state level, but ultimately our chief medical executive realized we 
couldn’t say no, and that we had to focus on the best way we could use it.” On a similar 
note, a preparedness coordinator reported difficulties with educating the public about the 
utility of KI: “Whenever I talk about KI, I always push the point that it’s only for the 
thyroid, and really, truly, the KI is more for the kids. Of course, we give it out to everyone.”
There were concerns that KI use would delay evacuation as people spent time searching for 
KI. One emergency preparedness director expressed dissatisfaction at the inclusion of KI in 
the state’s plan, stating, “We weren’t exactly for the state KI plan. Evacuation is our key…
We were never excited about people thinking that the KI would be worth something.” 
Another state, in order to prevent such delays, distributes KI exclusively at reception centers 
located outside the evacuation area: “For the most part, the plan calls for pre-distribution of 
KI, but individuals will probably receive KI at the reception center after [decontamination] 
and monitoring.”
3.9 Expanding the 10-mile EPZ
Interviewees were opposed to expanding the 10-mile EPZ without a strong scientific 
rationale, which they believe had not been articulated. In fact, many shared the judgment 
that scientific data does not support expanding the 10-mile EPZ based on their 
understanding that the plant in their EPZ does not contain enough nuclear material to even 
reach 10 miles. One emergency management director stated, “If the science says to expand 
it, we’ll expand it. But we can’t let politics drive decisions.” A member of a state department 
of health concurred, reasoning that “it’s important to consider the outcome – that has to do 
with the potential benefits and costs in relationship to probabilities. If there is no science 
either way, you are just exchanging arbitrary boundaries.” In fact, one planning officer even 
suggested that scaling the EPZ back to five miles would be a more prudent course of action.
Other reasons cited against expansion are the operational challenges associated with the 
increase in population covered in a 20-mile zone. One informant noted, “If they were to 
expand the size of the EPZ, even by a small amount, the area included would be huge. We’d 
have to go back and reconsider how we do things in light of the added area of responsibility. 
It’s a lot more people that you’re bringing into that umbrella.” Furthermore, several 
interviewees pointed out that preparedness activities already take place outside the 10-mile 
EPZ (including within the 50-mile EPZ). In one particular jurisdiction containing a 
peninsula, EPZ expansion would actually force residents to evacuate towards the nuclear 
power plant.
3.10 Perceived Gaps
Gaps in nuclear preparedness identified by numerous interviewees included: ongoing 
challenges associated with inter-jurisdictional collaboration, particularly with respect to 
divergent approaches between neighboring states; lack of pre-event situational awareness of 
agricultural facilities and assets within the EPZ; lack of availability of qualified expert 
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radiological staff; and the need for increased cooperation with federal partners with 
responsibilities within the EPZ (e.g., US Coast Guard, military bases).
4 Discussion
Based on interviewee reports, several themes were identified by the research team as 
important findings, avenues for further research, and areas where preparedness might be 
further enhanced surrounding nuclear power plants.
4.1 Educational and Communication Efforts Should Reflect the Modern Digital Age
During many recent disasters, two-way communication between emergency agencies has 
become emblematic of a 21st century disaster response.
It is concerning that nuclear power emergency preparedness is limited – by regulation – to 
employing phone books and calendars as their primary means of public outreach, tools that 
have largely been jettisoned in favor of improved digital-based applications. Despite the 
widely shared views that using newer technologies for public messaging would bolster 
preparedness efforts, social media is seldom used for radiological emergency preparedness 
in EPZs.
Continued reliance on outdated modes of outreach will hamper the ability of public 
messaging to reach as wide an audience as possible – a fact reinforced by the utility of social 
media following the accident at Fukushima (Friedman 2011). Also, the fact that many 
emergency agencies do not yet have an active social media presence around nuclear 
preparedness issues limits the situational awareness of emergency agencies. Efforts should 
be made to update regulation and communication practices to make use of the most effective 
digital tools.
4.2 Nuclear Power Companies Strengthen Preparedness Activities
The fact that all county-level emergency managers interviewed reported that they receive 
financial support for nuclear emergency preparedness from nuclear power plants illustrates 
the fundamental role that utilities play in fostering expertise and capacity at the local level.
The assistance provided by nuclear power companies to emergency management agencies 
extends beyond the financial to include a close day-to-day working relationship that 
facilitates the situational awareness of all parties’ operational needs, capacity, and status; an 
open dialogue; and an acute awareness of their interdependence.
This is consistent with emergency preparedness in other realms, where close relationships 
between private entities and public safety agencies are crucial for resiliency and an 
efficacious response to emergencies (Chen et al. 2013).
4.3 Public Health Agencies Should be a Major Component of Response
As was evident during the events after Fukushima, the public had an acute demand for 
public health expertise (Osnos 2011). Since 9/11, public health agencies have expended 
great effort to augment their public health emergency preparedness activities by bolstering 
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their public outreach, crisis communication strategies, and ability to provide the public with 
unified messaging amongst the cacophony of voices during a disaster.
In matters of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness, however, local and state 
governments largely invest emergency management agencies with the bulk of these 
responsibilities, while leaving health department emergency preparedness professionals – 
routinely in action for infectious disease outbreaks and other disasters and emergencies – 
underutilized.
Efforts should be made to fully integrate public health agencies into EPZ planning at both 
the state- and local-levels. The expertise and judgment of health officials would be 
especially important in planning around evacuations during which a whole range of health 
concerns would exist along with special populations who would need particular attention.
4.4 Scientific Evidence-Base Should Provide Rationale for Planning and Decision Making
Nuclear regulatory agencies should seriously address the position amongst county-level 
emergency managers that science is not driving policy decisions. Such a perception – 
whether accurate or not – poses a major challenge for emergency preparedness by fostering 
disconnect between ground-level workers and senior policy leaders. Prior to any proposed 
changes to the EPZ, a rigorous and scientific basis should be provided specific to the 
characteristics of individual plants.
Additionally, the results of recent scientific research should be employed to optimally design 
public education programs (Glik 2007). In the few instances in which education has been 
measured, the results of current passive communication efforts are not encouraging (Rosselli 
et al. 2011; Zwolinski et al. 2012; Review of NUREG-0654 2013). Educational efforts 
should also reflect emerging data from Fukushima where Internet-based sources of public 
information about radiation – as opposed to the diffusion of knowledge from neighbors and 
coworkers – was found to be a predictor of greater comprehension of radiation issues by the 
public (Kanda et al. 2013).
4.5 Optimizing the Management of Cross-State EPZs
As nuclear power plant EPZs are not always located in one state’s jurisdiction (or, in some 
cases, even one FEMA region) challenges emerge due to disparate planning efforts 
employed by neighboring states. During an emergency situation, having divergent 
approaches may have deleterious consequences. To improve coordination and minimize 
confusion some jurisdictions have imported practices from their neighboring states.
As nuclear power plant emergency preparedness is enhanced, special attention should be 
paid to these unique situations in which, as Stoto notes, rational loci for emergency planning 
may not be apparent (Stoto and Morse 2008). Methods for minimizing public confusion 
should be evaluated and addressed by focused exercises coupled with population interviews.
4.6 All-Hazards Preparedness Implications
State-level interviewees consistently conveyed that counties and municipalities within EPZs 
were better prepared for all-hazards emergencies than other counties in their state. Increased 
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emergency planning around the nuclear power plant has repercussions that positively 
enhance the general preparedness of counties to all hazards, a finding previously noted by 
McHugh et al. (2004). By virtue of the fact that exercises, communication activities, and 
enhanced emergency agency funding are present in such counties, spillover effects to 
blizzard response, pandemic planning, and other areas occur. The public health preparedness 
activities and structure of counties within 10-mile EPZs should be studied and, perhaps, used 
as models of preparedness. The aims of such a study would be to evaluate the mechanics of 
non-nuclear emergency response that occur in EPZ counties and extract procedures and 
processes that could be replicated in non-nuclear counties.
5 Limitations
Though our study provided a unique opportunity for emergency preparedness officials from 
varied jurisdictions to provide their impressions regarding emergency planning, due to 
logistical constraints, it was not feasible to conduct interviews with all individuals 
responsible for radiological emergency preparedness in all 65 EPZs across the country. Our 
study could be improved by inclusion of a greater number of states and counties. Also, some 
findings reported in this study could reflect recall and related biases by interviewees and 
interviewers. Future studies on this topic may benefit from using a survey instrument to 
facilitate inclusion of a larger sample size, as well as key community stakeholders and 
relevant officials from other nations.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to catalog and sample the various public health preparedness 
activities that occur in the 10-mile EPZs of the nation’s nuclear power plants. Our study 
provides a first-of-its-kind glimpse into the day-to-day activities of nuclear preparedness 
personnel, identifies current practices and common challenges, and provides a basis for 
further research into this field, which could include studying response hospitals, cross-state 
coordination, and optimal approaches to public education.
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Appendix 1. Interview Questions
Organizational
• Describe your local organization for preparing and responding to a radiological 
emergency?
• What positions/employees are responsible for planning and response?
Exercises
• Why types of exercises are conducted within your EPZ?
• How often are exercises conducted?
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• Who are the primary organizers of exercises?
• How are exercises funded?
• What parties are involved in exercises?
Public Education
• What types of public education are conducted within your EPZ?
• What mediums/mechanisms are used in public education (e.g., radio, TV, social 
media, etc.)?
• How often does public outreach occur?
• Is effectiveness of public education evaluated?
Messaging
• Have prescripted pre- and post-event emergency communications been prepared?
• Through what channels will communication take place?
Hospital Preparedness
• In what ways are hospitals within your EPZ included in preparedness for a 
radiological emergency?
• Are volunteers included in emergency planning?
Evacuation
• Are evacuation routes predefined?
• Are traffic controls and/or access controls incorporated into emergency evacuation 
plans?
• Is shelter-in-place part of response planning?
KI
• Is KI pre-distributed within your jurisdiction?
• Is public education on KI conducted? Measured?
Jurisdictions
• Are any other jurisdictions included in planning?
• Do you have other counties or unaffected municipalities on standby for assistance?
Public Health
• What, if any, interaction/coordination occurs with the state or county public health 
department?
Expansion
• What are your thoughts about expanding the 10-mile EPZ?
Gaps, etc.
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• Is there anything you believe is missing from your EPZ that would facilitate better 
management?
• How do you perceive variations in EPZs around the state/country?
• Is there a particularly exemplary county/EPZ in PA? in the nation?
• Do you notice any differences amongst the encompassed municipalities in their 
planning? Do they primarily follow the county’s lead?
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Concept of EPZs. Image courtesy of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NUREG-0654).
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